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Abstract
We investigate the content identification problem from an information theoretic perspective and
derive its fundamental limits. Here, a rights-holder company desires to keep track of illegal uses of
its commercial content, by utilizing resources of a security company, while securing the privacy of
its content. Due to privacy issues, the rights-holder company only reveals certain hash values of the
original content to the security company. We view the commercial content of the rights-holder company
as the codebook of an encoder and the hash values of the content (made available to the security
company) as the codebook of a decoder, i.e., the corresponding codebooks of the encoder and the
decoder are not the same. Hence, the content identification is modelled as a communication problem
using asymmetric codebooks by an encoder and a decoder. We further address “the privacy issue” in the
content identification by adding “security” constraints to the communication setup to prevent estimation
of the encoder codewords given the decoder codewords. By this modeling, the proposed problem of
reliable communication with asymmetric codebooks with security constraints provides the fundamental
limits of the content identification problem. To this end, we introduce an information capacity and prove
that this capacity is equal to the operation capacity of the system under i.i.d. encoder codewords providing
the fundamental limits for content identification. As a well known and widely studied framework, we
evaluate the capacity for a binary symmetric channel and provide closed form expressions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the “content identification” problem has attracted a growing interest from the signal
processing community due to its potential usage as a filtering technique for file and multimedia sharing
[1]–[10]. Currently, several video sharing sites, including Youtube, Google Video and Dailymotion,
planted content identification technology in order to allow copyright holders to identify and disable
illegally uploaded versions of their content in real-time. In these content identification applications,
comparison of the whole file is naturally inefficient and in some cases impossible due to computational
complexity. However, instead of matching the whole content, using robust hashing methods enables real-
time content identification possible, where short fingerprints extracted from the content are matched [1],
[5], [11], [12]. To this end, this paper particularly focuses on the information-theoretic analysis of the
fundamental limits of content identification by modeling the content identification as a communication
problem using asymmetric codebooks under certain security constraints.
In the most generic content identification framework, one seeks to find an efficient method to perform
an “anti-piracy search” via side information at the receiver side. In this framework, a “rights-holder
company”, i.e., a company that possesses a commercially valuable signal such as a video, an audio
or a document, seeks to identify illegal uses of its commercial content. However, due to the lack of
necessary infrastructure, the rights-holder company is required to employ resources of another company,
say a “security company”, in order to perform the content identification. As a consequence, the rights-
holder company forms a collaboration with the security company to carry out the illegal content search.
However due to obvious privacy issues, instead of revealing the whole private content, the rights-holder
company only provides certain hash values, extracted from the original content, to the security company.
The security company needs to perform content identification only with the help of these hash values,
i.e., side information, derived from the private content revealed by the rights-holder company.
In this paper, we adapt an information-theoretic approach to the content identification problem and
derive the fundamental limits by modeling content identification as a communications problem. In this
framework, we view the content owned by the rights-holder company as the codebook of an encoder. The
illegal uploading of the content, which possibly includes noise, corresponds to the message transmission
stage of the noisy communication channel. The hash values of the content made available to the security
company, i.e., the side information, correspond to the codebook of the decoder. Hence, the content
identification problem is modelled as a communication problem in which the encoder and the decoder
3are communicating with each other, i.e., the encoder seeks to send a message to the decoder, while the
encoder would like to maintain a reliable communication with the encoder. Note that due to security
requirements, the encoder does not reveal its codebook to the decoder. Instead, the encoder shares a
perturbed version of its codebook with the decoder. Hence the corresponding codebooks of the encoder
and the decoder are not the same, i.e., there is an asymmetry between these codebooks. Therefore the
content identification is modelled as a communications problem with a noisy channel, where there is
an asymmetry between the codebooks of the encoder and the decoder. We further address the privacy
issue in the content identification problem by adding security constraints to the communication setup
to prevent the estimation of the encoder codewords given the decoder codewords. By this modeling,
the proposed problem of reliable communication with asymmetric codebooks with security constraints
provides the fundamental limits of the content identification problem. Under this framework, we derive and
characterize the maximum achievable rate of reliable communication. We further evaluate our results for
a binary symmetric case, where the encoder codebook is binary, the perturbation between the codebooks
of the encoder and the decoder is a binary symmetric distribution and the communication channel is a
binary symmetric channel.
In particular, to provide the fundamental limits on content identification with security constraints, we
study a point-to-point communication problem, where the communication channel employs asymmetric
codebooks, i.e., the encoder and the decoder codebooks are not the same. We concentrate on the case
where the decoder’s codebook is a perturbed version of the encoder codebook and optimize the reliable
communication rate over the joint statistical distribution of the codebooks of the encoder and decoder.
Thus, we consider the statistical characterizations of both the encoder codebook and the perturbation
and carry out optimization in the general case. In this sense, we generalize the original point-to-point
communication setup proposed by Shannon [13] by introducing reliable communication using asymmetric
codebooks.
Problems related to the capacity of communication channels with side information is heavily investi-
gated in the information theory literature [14]–[17]. However, the introduced asymmetric codebook nature
of our problem with certain security constraints significantly differentiates the content identification setup
from that of the generic side information related problems. Note that the generic side information related
problems studied in the literature usually includes a common codebook shared by both the encoder and
the decoder [14], [15]. On the contrary, here, due to the nature of content identification application, the
codebooks are asymmetric. Furthermore in the generic communications problems with side information,
either the transmitter or the receiver has access to side information, e.g., information about certain system
4parameters or the noise, which is not available to the other. However, in our setup, the system parameters,
which correspond to the statistical characterization of the elements of the system, are available for both the
encoder and the decoder. Moreover, while a similar communication problem using asymmetric codebooks
is studied in [18], the statistical characterization of the perturbation between the codebooks of the encoder
and the decoder is assumed to be fixed, which reduces the generality of this setup. Hence the privacy of
the valuable content is not guaranteed while the rate of reliable communication is optimized in [18], unlike
this paper. This paper derives and characterizes the maximum achievable rate of reliable communication
while maintaining “security” of the valuable content after introducing “security” conditions from an
estimation theoretic perspective.
In this paper, we first characterize the fundamental limits of the described content identification appli-
cation by deriving the maximum rate of error-free information transfer of the prescribed communication
setup. We consider the case where the codewords of encoder are drawn identically and independently
from a discrete and finite set. We further assume that the communication channel between the encoder
and the decoder and the statistical characterization of the perturbation between the encoder and the
decoder codebooks, i.e., the signal hashing in content identification, are memoryless. We then provide
the maximum achievable rate of reliable communication, which is shown to be the maximum of mutual
information between the codeword of the decoder and the output of the channel, where the maximization
carried over a set of joint distribution of the encoder’s codeword and the decoder’s codeword satisfying
certain security constraints. Furthermore, we also evaluate the capacity for binary symmetric setup, i.e.,
the alphabet where the encoder codewords are drown is binary, the perturbation between the codebooks
is a binary symmetric distribution and the communication channel is a binary symmetric channel.
We begin with the notation and the problem description in Section II. In Section III, we derive and
characterize the corresponding maximum achievable rate of reliable communications. Then, in Section
III-B and Section III-C, we provide proofs for the forward and the converse statements, respectively. In
Section IV, we analyze the capacity of the binary symmetric case and provide a closed form expression.
The paper concludes with discussions in Section V.
II. NOTATION AND PROBLEM SETUP
A. Notation
Boldface letters and regular letters with subscripts denote vectors and individual elements of vectors,
respectively. Furthermore, capital letters and lowercase letters denote random variables and individual
realizations of the corresponding random variable, respectively. The vector [a1, a2, . . . , an]
T
is denoted
5by an. The abbreviations “i.i.d.”, “p.m.f.”, and “w.l.o.g.” are shorthands for the terms “independent
identically distributed”, “probability mass function”, and “without loss of generality”, respectively. The
entropy function of a discrete random variable X is denoted by H (X) = −
∑
x∈X p (x) log p (x) where
X is defined on the alphabet X with the corresponding p.m.f. p (x)1. Similarly, H (X,Y ), H (X|Y ),
I (X;Y ) denote the joint entropy of X and Y , conditional entropy of X given Y , and the mutual
information between X and Y for discrete random variables X and Y , respectively.
B. Problem Setup and Relevant Definitions
We consider a content identification problem, (1) where a rights-holder company desires to keep track
of the illegal uses of its commercial content (2) by utilizing the resources of a security company (3)
while securing the privacy of the content. The illegal uses of the content can be broadcasting, uploading
or publishing the original content or a slightly disturbed version of it without proper consent of the
rights-holder company. Due to privacy issues, the rights-holder company only reveals certain hash values
of the original content to the security company. In this sense, the rights-holder company wants to ensure
the privacy of the content while providing sufficient side information, i.e., hash values (which makes the
anti-piracy search feasible), on the original content to the security company.
We view the commercial content of the rights-holder company as the codebook of an encoder and the
hash values of the content (made available to the security company) as the codebook of a decoder. Hence
the corresponding codebooks of the encoder and the decoder are not the same, i.e., there is an asymmetry
between these codebooks due to the described nature of the content identification problem. Furthermore
we model the illegal uploading or broadcasting the content as the message transmission phase of the
communication framework and the identification of the illegal content as the decoding the output of
the corresponding communication setup. Therefore the content identification problem is modelled by a
communication framework with a noisy channel, where there is an asymmetry between the codebooks
of the encoder and the decoder. We further address “the privacy issue” in the content identification
problem by adding security constraints to the communication setup to prevent the estimation of the
encoder codewords given the decoder codewords. By this modeling, the proposed problem of reliable
communication with asymmetric codebooks with security constraints constitutes the fundamental limits of
the content identification problem. To this end, we first introduce the corresponding discrete memoryless
communication channel setup and define the related error events. We then rigorously characterize the
1Unless otherwise stated, all the logarithms are base-2.
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Fig. 1: Schematic diagram of a discrete memoryless channel with asymmetric codebooks.
security constraints of this communication setup to address the privacy issue in content identification by
introducing security related definitions from an estimation theoretic perspective.
We first provide the necessary channel code and related error events to quantify the fundamental rates
of reliable communications with asymmetric codebooks, which in turn reveals the fundamental limits of
the content identification problem. A broad definition of asymmetric channel codes, which constitutes
the fundamental part of reliable communications with asymmetric codebooks, will be provided. Such a
communication system, which is depicted in Fig. 1, consists of two components: a discrete-memoryless
communication channel (DMCC) denoted by (X , p (y|x) ,Y) (with single letter input alphabet X , single
letter output alphabet Y , single letter transition probability p (y|x), cf. [19], p. 193) and a
(
2nR, n
)
asymmetric channel code 2 (cf. Def. 2.1).
Definition 2.1: Given discrete finite alphabets X , U , Y , a
(
2nR, n
)
asymmetric channel code (ACC),
denoted by (W, fn, hn, gn) consists of: a message set, W
△
=
{
1, . . . , 2nR
}
; a deterministic encoder
codebook generator function, fn : W → X n, where fn (w) = xn (w) for all w ∈ W; a deterministic
decoder codebook generator function, hn : W → Un, where hn (w) = un (w) for all w ∈ W; and a
deterministic decoding function, gn : Yn →W∪{0}, which assigns a decision (denoted by Wˆ ) to every
received sequence yn ∈ Yn, where the decision of “null” is denoted by 0.
Remark 2.1: In the considered setup, W ∈ W represents the message, which is uniformly distributed
over the discrete finite setW . Following the standard information-theoretic notation, we use the shorthands
Xn := xn (W ), Un := un (W ). Here, Yn ∈ Yn denotes the output of the DMCC (X , p (y|x) ,Y) when
the input is Xn. Note that for the related content identification problem, the encoder codebook Xn
corresponds to the commercial content and transmission of the message over the DMCC (X , p (y|x) ,Y)
corresponds to illegally uploading or broadcasting the private content (possibly with some disturbance).
Furthermore the statistical characterization of the perturbation, which corresponds to the conditional p.m.f.
2Throughout the paper, for the sake of convenience, we assume that 2nR ∈ Z+ for all R ∈ R+ ∪ {0} and for any n ∈ Z+.
7p (u|x), corresponds to the robust signal hashing.
The related error events will be shortly stated here to make the setup complete. Given an ACC code
(W, fn, gn, hn) and the DMCC (X , p (y|x) ,Y), the conditional probability of error, λw, conditioned on
the transmitted message W = w is given by
λw
△
= Pr (g (Yn) 6= w |W = w) ,
where the probability is computed over the DMCC (X , p (y|x) ,Y). Maximal probability of error, λ(n),
is defined as, λ(n) = maxw∈W λw. Finally, the average probability of error, P
(n)
e , is given by
P (n)e
△
= Pr
(
Wˆ 6= W
)
=
∑
w∈W
Pr (g (Yn) 6= w |W = w) Pr (W = w) = 2−nR
∑
w∈W
λw.
We point out that due to the nature of the problem setup, generation of the decoder codebook and
generation of the channel output are two independent events, given the encoder codebook. In fact, unlike
“broadcast-channel-like” setups [19], these two events does not need to happen simultaneously. Hence
for the random variables X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y and U ∈ U with conditional p.m.f.s p (y|x) and p (u|x), we
have p (y, u|x) = p (y|x) p (u|x), which implies that U ↔ X ↔ Y forms a Markov chain in the specified
order.
The mismatch between deterministic codebook generation functions of encoder and decoder, namely
f (.) and h (.) in the respected order, constitutes the asymmetric nature of the problem. Hence, in
accordance with the problem definition, the functions f (.) and h (.) are only known by encoder and
decoder, respectively.
Finally, we define the necessary security conditions for the communication setup stated in Def. 2.1
(and shown in Fig. 1) to address the privacy issue in the content identification problem. For a given ACC
(W, fn, hn, gn), we introduce the notion of “security” from an estimation theoretic perspective [20]. The
asymmetric codebook generator functions fn and hn are treated to be more “secure” if it is “harder”
to estimate the encoder codewords {xn (W )} given the decoder codewords {un (W )}. Note that this
approach is philosophically analogous to the desired “approximate one-way” property of the robust hash
functions. In order to achieve this task, we introduce the notion of a “codebook estimator function” and
a distortion metric that quantifies its performance.
For a given ACC (W, fn, hn, gn), a codebook estimator function aims to estimate encoder codeword(s)
given the corresponding decoder codeword(s) as:
8• a single-letter codebook estimator function π operates on individual codeword elements such that
π : U → X .
• an n-fold codebook estimator function πn is a mapping such that πn : Un → X n.
The performance of codebook estimation is quantified via the following:
• a single-letter estimator distortion function is a mapping
d : X ×X → Rd
where Rd ⊆ R
+ ∪ {0}; the estimator distortion d (π (u) , x) is a measure of the cost of estimating
x by π (u).
• an n-fold estimator distortion function is a mapping
dn : X
n × X n → Rd
where dn (xˆ
n,xn)
△
= 1
n
∑n
i=1 d (xˆi, xi), xˆ
△
= πn (un).
An estimator distortion function is said to be “bounded” if the set of its values is bounded, i.e., there
exists a D ∈ R such that maxxˆ∈X ,x∈X d (xˆ, x) < D. Given the codebook estimator function π
n and
estimator distortion function dn, we next define the α-secure ACC codes which satisfies certain security
constraints.
Definition 2.2: An ACC (W, fn, hn, gn) is said to be α-secure if
min
πn :Un→Xn
E [dn (π
n (Un) ,Xn)] ≥ α, (1)
where the expectation is with respect to the joint probability distribution of Xn and Un:
E [dn (π
n (Un) ,Xn)] =
∑
u
n∈Un
∑
x
n∈Xn
p (un,xn) dn (π
n (un) ,xn) .
We emphasize that the minimization in (1) is carried over the set of all possible n-fold estimator func-
tions πn which has no restrictions, i.e., the estimator does not need to be sequential. The comprehensive
approach in the Definition 2.2 enables sustaining the security regardless of the type of the attack in the
content identification problem [20]. Further note that the minimum in (1) always exists since both the
range and the domain of πn are discrete, i.e., finite. Also, for all α1 ≤ α2, an α2-secure ACC is also
α1-secure.
In this paper, we optimize the reliable communication rate of the system defined in Def. 2.1, by
sustaining the security of the encoder codebook in an estimation theoretic perspective. Since the opti-
mization is carried over the joint p.m.f. p (x, u), existence of the two generating functions f (.) and h (.)
9to maintain the predefined objectives of the problem is proved in this paper. Also as a side note, the
statistical perturbation between the encoder codebook CX and decoder codebook CU , modeled by the
conditional p.m.f. p (u|x), is assumed to be memoryless in this paper. Hence we study the memoryless
ACCs that are rigorously defined in the following.
Definition 2.3: Given a distribution p (u, x) (with the domain U×X ), a
(
2nR, n
)
ACC (W, fn, hn, gn)
is said to be memoryless if fn and hn carry out i.i.d. random codebook generation according to it.
Specifically, both fn (resp. hn) generate 2nR codewords {xn (w)}2
nR
w=1 (resp. {u
n (w)}2
nR
w=1) (each of
which is of length-n) such that
p
(
un (1) ,un (2) , . . . ,un
(
2nR
)
,xn (1) ,xn (2) , . . . ,xn
(
2nR
))
=
2nR∏
w=1
n∏
i=1
p (ui (w) , xi (w)) .
Such codes are termed as memoryless asymmetric channel codes (MACC).
We next derive the maximum reliable communication rate of the MACCs corresponding to the DMCC
given in Fig. 1 under certain security constraints to determine the fundamental limits of content identifi-
cation.
III. MEMORYLESS ASYMMETRIC CHANNEL CODES UNDER SECURITY CONSTRAINTS - CAPACITY
RESULTS
In this section, we analyze and optimize the reliable communication rate of the communication
system stated in Section II-B under certain security constraints. We first introduce the maximum reliable
communication rate and the related definitions over memoryless asymmetric channel codes. We then
give our fundamental result in Theorem 3.1 stating the channel coding results for the aforementioned
setup, i.e., the maximum rate of error-free information transmission satisfying certain security constraints,
which in turn reveals the fundamental limits of the content identification problem. We then provide the
achievability proof (cf. Section III-B) and the converse proof (cf. Section III-C) of the Theorem 3.1.
A. Capacity of MACC under Security Constraints
In this section, we introduce the capacity, i.e., the maximum reliable communication rate, of MACC
under certain security constraints. Before giving the capacity definition and the channel coding theorem,
we need to define “achievability” notion, i.e., what we mean when we say that a communication rate R
is achievable with a security constraint α. A pair (R,α) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence
of
(
2nR, n
)
MACC (W, fn, hn, gn) such that
lim
n→∞
P (n)e = lim
n→∞
Pr [W 6= g (Yn)] = 0 and lim
n→∞
min
πn :Un→XN
E [d (πn (Un) ,Xn)] ≥ α. (2)
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The secure MACC region is defined as the closure of all achievable (R,α) points and for any given
α, the secure MACC capacity C (α) is the supremum of rates R such that (R,α) is in the secure MACC
region. We next define a mathematical function of the MACC, which we call the information secure
MACC capacity. Then, we state the main result of this paper by proving that the information secure
MACC capacity is equal to the secure MACC capacity. Before we define the information secure MACC
capacity, we first provide the definition of a feasible set of joint p.m.f.s p (u, x), denoted by Pα, which
satisfies a certain security constraint. We then give the definition of the secure MACC capacity as the
maximum of the mutual information between the decoder’s codeword and the communication channel
output, where the maximization is carried over Pα.
Definition 3.1: For a given α, the set of all joint distributions p (u, x) that ensures the MACC (W, fn, hn, gn)
to be α-secure is given by
Pα
△
=
{
p (u, x)
∣∣∣ min
π :U→X
E [d (π (U) ,X)] ≥ α
}
. (3)
We next define the information secure MACC capacity that employs a maximization over the set Pα.
We then introduce a theorem, which states that the proposed information secure MACC capacity is equal
to the secure MACC capacity, and constitutes the main result of this paper by providing the fundamental
limit on the content identification problem.
Definition 3.2: For any given DMCC (X , p (y|x) ,Y), bounded distortion function d (xˆ, x) and α, if
Pα (defined via (3)) is non-empty, then the information secure MACC capacity is defined as
C(I) (α)
△
= max
p(u,x)∈Pα
I (U ;Y ) . (4)
We next show that the set Pα given in (3) satisfies certain properties in the following proposition.
We emphasize that by Proposition 3.1, the capacity function given in (4) becomes definite, hence this
completes the definition of the information secure MACC capacity.
Proposition 3.1: For a given α, the feasible set Pα satisfies the following properties,
• If α is such that Pα is the empty set, then C (α) = 0.
• If α is such that Pα is non-empty, then it is compact.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In the following remark, we state that the information secure MACC capacity is well-defined by
employing the results of Proposition 3.1.
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Remark 3.1: From proposition 3.1, we know that the set that C(I) is defined on Pα is compact. Then,
by using “Maximum-Minimum Theorem” [21], I (U ;Y ) is bounded and gets its minimum and maximum
values on the compact set Pα, since I (U ;Y ) is a continuous function of p (u, x). Hence we can write
maximum instead of supremum in the definition of C(I).
We next introduce a theorem which states that the secure MACC capacity, i.e., the supremum of rates R
such that (R,α) is in the secure MACC region, is equal to the information secure MACC capacity given
in (4). The following theorem constitutes the main contribution of this paper by providing the maximum
achievable rate of reliable communication for the communication system defined in Section II-B. There-
fore the theorem introduces the fundamental limits on the content identification problem, i.e., provides
the upper bound on the performance of any content identification algorithm satisfying certain level of
privacy.
Theorem 3.1: Secure Memoryless Asymmetric Channel Coding Theorem: For a discrete memoryless
communications channel (X , p (y|x) ,Y) and for any given α, if Pα (defined via (3)) is non-empty, then
we have
C (α) = C(I) (α) , (5)
where C(I) (α) is given via (4). However, if Pα is empty, then C (α) = 0.
Before presenting the proof of the theorem, we first introduce three lemmas that are used in the proof.
The first lemma provides the memoryless property of the joint p.m.f. p (y, u). The other two provide
essential results about the “separability” of the n-fold codebook estimator function πn.
Lemma 3.1: Given p (xn) =
∏n
i=1 p (xi), a discrete memoryless communications channel (X , p (y|x) ,Y),
and a
(
2nR, n
)
MACC (X , CX , p (u|x) ,U , CU ), we have
p (yn,un) =
n∏
i=1
p (yi, ui) , (6)
where p (y, u) =
∑n
i=1 p(x)p(y|x)p(u|x).
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Proof: Following the definition and properties of joint p.m.f. [22], we have
p (yn,un) =
∑
x
n∈X
p (xn,yn,un)
=
∑
x
n∈Xn
p (xn) p (yn|xn) p (un|xn) (7)
=
∑
x
n∈Xn
n∏
i=1
p (xi) p (yi|xi) p (ui|xi) (8)
=
n∏
i=1
∑
xi∈X
p (xi) p (yi|xi) p (ui|xi)
=
n∏
i=1
∑
xi∈X
p (xi, yi, ui) ,
=
n∏
i=1
p (yi, ui) . (9)
where (7) follows from that U , X and Y forms a Markov chain in the specified order, i.e., U ↔ X ↔ Y
and (8) follows since the communication channel and the perturbation are memoryless.
Lemma 3.2: Given n and the triplet (X,U, V n1 ) such that X ↔ U ↔ V
n
1 where ∀i vi ∈ U , u ∈ U ,
x ∈ X , we have
min
π¯ :Un+1→X
E [d (π¯ (U, V n1 ) ,X)] = min
π :U→X
E [d (π (U) ,X)] (10)
Proof: Let Xˆ
△
= π¯ (U, V n1 ). Then,
min
π¯ :Un+1→X
E [d (π¯ (U, V n1 ) ,X)] = min
π¯ :Un+1→X
E
[
d
(
Xˆ,X
)]
(11)
where the expectation is with respect to the joint p.m.f. of (X,U, V n1 ).
From Bayesian estimation theory, this is equivalent to solving
min
xˆ∈X
∑
x∈X
d (xˆ, x) p (x|u, vn1 ) (12)
for any given U = u, V n1 = v
n
1 . Note that the argument f (x) is known as posterior risk conditioned on
(U, V n1 ) = (u, v
n
1 ). Since X ↔ U ↔ V
n
1 , we have p (x|u, v
n
1 ) = p (x|u), which implies (12) is equivalent
to
min
xˆ∈X
∑
x∈X
d (xˆ, x) p (x|u) . (13)
On the other hand, (13) would be the problem resulting from solving the right hand side of (10) via
following analogous steps to the aforementioned procedure. Hence, this completes the proof.
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Lemma 3.3: Given (Un,Xn) ∼ p (un, xn) =
∏n
i=1 p (ui|xi) p (xi), we have
min
πn :Un→Xn
E [dn (πn (Un) ,Xn)] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
π :U→X
E [d (π (Ui) ,Xi)] . (14)
Lemma 3.3 states that the best n-fold codebook estimator function is separable, i.e., its performance
can be quantified via the performance of the best single-letter codebook estimator functions. Hence, it
implies that in the content identification problem, the performance of the best attack towards the private
content can be determined via the performance of the best attack towards a single entry of the content.
Proof: Let π¯n = argmin
πn :Un→Xn
E [dn (πn (Un) ,Xn)]. Furthermore given π¯n(.), define π¯i : U
n → X
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that π¯n (un) = (π¯1 (u
n) , π¯2 (u
n) , . . . , π¯n (u
n)). Then, we have
min
πn :Un→Xn
E [dn (πn (Un) ,Xn)] = E [dn (π¯n (Un) ,Xn)]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E [d (π¯i (U
n) ,Xi)]
≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
π˜n :Un→X
E [d (π˜n (Un) ,Xi)] (15)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
π :U→X
E [d (π (Ui) ,Xi)] ,
where (15) follows since per definition
min
π˜n :Un→X
E [d (π˜n (Un) ,Xi)] ≤ E [d (π¯i (U
n) ,Xi)] (16)
for all π˜i and (16) follows from Lemma 3.2.
Now let π∗i = argmin
π :U→X
E [d (π (Ui) ,Xi)] for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and subsequently define πn,∗ : Un →
X n such that πn,∗ (Un) = [π∗1, π
∗
2 , . . . , π
∗
n]. Then, we have
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
π :U→X
E [d (π (Ui) ,Xi)] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E [d (π∗i (Ui) ,Xi)]
= E [dn (πn,∗ (Un) ,Xn)]
≥ min
πn :Un→Xn
E [dn (πn (Un) ,Xn)] . (17)
Combining (16) and (17) we get (14). This completes the proof.
Since we have the necessary lemmas, we next provide the proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof of
Theorem 3.1 is separated into two parts, i.e, achievability and converse proofs. In the achievability proof,
we validate the achievability in the theorem, i.e., we show that every rate R < C(I) (α) is achievable.
In the converse proof, which concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1, we show that every achievable rate R
satisfies R < C(I) (α). We next continue with the proof of the forward statement of Theorem 3.1.
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B. Achievability
In this section, we provide a theorem which constitutes the achievability proof of Theorem 3.1 by
showing that any rate below the information secure MACC capacity, i.e., C(I), is achievable. The
following theorem emphasizes the feasibility of the secure and reliable communication with a rate
below the information secure MACC capacity. In the content identification problem, it corresponds to
the achievability of any performance below the fundamental limit for a certain level of privacy.
Theorem 3.2: (Achievability) For any given α such that Pα is non-empty, and for every rate R <
C(I) (α), there exists a sequence of
(
2nR, n
)
α-secure MACCs with arbitrarily small maximal probability
of error for sufficiently large n.
Proof: We prove that for any α with Pα 6= ∅, and any R < C
(I) (α), (R,α) pair is achievable by
proving the existence of a sequence of α-secure MACCs with rate R satisfying the achievability conditions
given in (2). In the encoding part, by choosing p (u, x) from the set Pα, encoder codebook CX and the
decoder codebook CU are generated as stated in Def. 2.3. After choosing a message w uniformly from the
message setW (i.e., Pr (W = w) = 2−nR for all w ∈ W), fn (w) = xn(w) is generated and transmitted
over the DMCC (X , p(y|x),Y), resulting in Yn such that Pr (Yn = yn|xn (w)) =
∏n
i=1 p (yi|xi (w)).
In the decoding part, we use jointly typical decoding. Note that {ui (W ) , Yi}
n
i=1 pairs are independent
of each other (cf. Lemma 3.1), where Yn is the resulting communication channel output corresponding
to the message W ∈ W . If a unique Wˆ ∈ W exists such that
(
un
(
Wˆ
)
,Yn
)
∈ A
(n)
ǫ (U, Y ), where
A
(n)
ǫ (U, Y ) is the ǫ-jointly-typical set [19], defined as
A(n)ǫ (U, Y )
△
=
{
(un,yn) : | −
1
n
log p (un)−H(U)| < ǫ, | −
1
n
log p (yn)−H(Y )| < ǫ, (18)
| −
1
n
log p (un,yn)−H(U, Y )| < ǫ
}
, (19)
where p (u, y) =
∑
x∈X p (x) p (y|x) p (u|x), then we declare g (Y
n) = Wˆ . Otherwise, i.e., if such a
Wˆ ∈ W is not unique or does not exist, then we declare g (Yn) = 0. The error event is defined as
E
△
=
{
Wˆ 6= W
}
. (20)
In order to prove that an (R,α) pair is achievable, we need to prove that the two achievability conditions
given in (2) holds. Since p (u, x) is chosen from the nonempty set Pα, we have
min
π :U→X
E [d (π (Ui) ,Xi)] ≥ α (21)
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for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Hence (21) yields
min
πn :Un→Xn
E [dn (πn (Un) ,Xn)] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
π :U→X
E [d (π (Ui) ,Xi)] , (22)
≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
α,
= α, (23)
where (22) follows from Lemma 3.3. Since (23) is true for all n > 0, we have
lim
n→∞
min
πn :Un→XN
E [d (πn (Un) ,Xn)] ≥ α. (24)
We now prove that the other condition of the achievability is satisfied, too, i.e., we show that
lim
n→∞
P (n)e = lim
n→∞
Pr [W 6= g (Yn)] = 0.
From the definition of average probability of error of an MACC we have
P (n)e
△
= Pr
(
Wˆ 6= W
)
=
∑
w∈W
Pr (g (Yn) 6= w |W = w) Pr (W = w) = 2−nR
∑
w∈W
λw.
We calculate the average probability of error by taking the average over all decoder codebooks,
Pr (E) =
∑
CU
Pr (CU )P
(n)
e (CU)
=
1
2nR
2nR∑
w=1
∑
CU
Pr (CU)λw (CU )
=
∑
CU
Pr (CU )λ1 (CU ) , (25)
= Pr (E|W = 1) ,
where (25) follows since the codebook construction is symmetric and does not depend on the particular
message that was sent. Hence, after this point, w.l.o.g., we assume the message W = 1 was sent.
Let Ei denotes the event that the codewordX
n(i) and Yn are jointly typical, where Yn is the resulting
output of the communication system corresponding to the codeword Xn(1). Hence we can define Ei as,
Ei
△
=
{
(un (i) ,Yn) ∈ A(n)ǫ
}
, i ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , 2nR
}
.
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Then, we can write the average probability of error as
P (n)e = Pr (E|W = 1)
= Pr (Ec1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3 . . . E2nR |W = 1) (26)
≤ Pr (Ec1|W = 1) +
2nR∑
i=2
Pr (Ei|W = 1) (27)
≤ ǫ+
2nR∑
i=2
2−n(I(U ;Y )−3ǫ), (28)
where (26) follows since an error occurs only if either the transmitted codeword is not jointly typical with
the received sequence, i.e., Ec1 occurs, or the received sequence is jointly typical with a wrong codeword,
i.e., Ei occurs for i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 2
nR}. Also (27) follows from the union bound and (28) follows from
the joint AEP theorem [19] since un(i) and un(1) are independent for i 6= 1.
Finally we can write
P (n)e ≤ ǫ+
2nR∑
i=2
2−n(I(U ;Y )−3ǫ)
= ǫ+ (2nR − 1)2−n(I(U ;Y )−3ǫ)
≤ ǫ+ 2−n(I(U ;Y )−3ǫ−R)
≤ 2ǫ,
for sufficiently large n and R < I (U ;Y ) − 3ǫ. Since for every rate R < I (U ;Y ), we can find ǫ > 0
and a sufficiently large n such that (29) holds. Combining (29) and (24), we have that for any given α
such that Pα is non-empty and for every rate R < C
(I) (α), the pair (R,α) is achievable. Note that as
mentioned in Remark 3.1, we can choose p (u, x) from the compact set Pα so as to maximize I (U ;Y )
and then the condition R < I (U ;Y ) can be replaced by the achievability condition R < C(I) (α).
We next provide the proof of the converse statement of Theorem 3.1.
C. Converse
In this section, we introduce a theorem providing the converse proof of the Theorem 3.1 by showing
that if a communication rate is achievable, then this rate should be below the information secure MACC
capacity, i.e., C(I). The following theorem emphasizes that the information secure MACC capacity
constitutes an upper bound for the rate of secure and reliable communication. In the content identification
problem, this provides the fundamental limit of successful anti-piracy search with a certain level of privacy.
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Theorem 3.3: (Converse) For any given α such that Pα is non-empty and for any
(
2nR, n
)
α-secure
MACC with λ(n) → 0, we have R < C(I) (α).
Proof: We begin the proof with a lemma that states the necessity of one-to-one property of the
deterministic decoder codebook generator function hn for error-free MACCs.
Lemma 3.4: For any given
(
2nR, n
)
MACC (W, fn, hn, gn) with λ(n) → 0, hn is necessarily a one-
to-one mapping.
Proof: Following the proof in Appendix III of [18], the proof follows.
Lemma 3.4 holds for general MACCs, hence it also applies for our setup, i.e., i.i.d. MACCs.
Since the transmitted message, i.e., W , and the communication channel output, i.e., Yn, have a joint
distribution and the decoder output, i.e., Wˆ , is a function of Yn, then W , Yn and Wˆ form a Markov
chain in the specified order, i.e., W ↔ Yn ↔ Wˆ . Similarly, since hn (W ) = un (W ) is a function of
W , then un(W ), W and Yn form a Markov chain in the that order, i.e., Un ↔ W ↔ Yn, where Un
denotes un (W ) notational simplicity. Combining these two Markov chains yields that Un, W , Yn and
Wˆ form a Markov chain in the specified order, i.e., Un ↔ W ↔ Yn ↔ Wˆ . Lemma 3.4 yields that
hn (·) is one-to-one, which further yields from the previous Markov chain that W , Un, Yn and Wˆ form
a Markov chain in that order, i.e., W ↔ Un ↔ Yn ↔ Wˆ .
We continue to examine the pair Un, Yn such that
p (yn|un) =
p (yn,un)
p (un)
=
∏n
i=1 p (yi, ui)
p (un)
(29)
=
∏n
i=1 p (yi, ui)∏n
i=1
[∑
xi
p(ui|xi)p(xi)
] (30)
=
n∏
i=1
p(yi|ui), (31)
where (29) follows from Lemma 3.1, (30) follows from the definition of MACC and that p (xn) =∏n
i=1 p(xi) and (31) follows from combining p(y, u) =
∑
xi
p(y|x)p(u|x)p(x) and p(yi|ui) =
p(yi,ui)∑
xi
p(ui|xi)p(xi)
due to Bayes’ rule.
Since the given MACC is α-secure, we have
α ≤ min
πn :Un→Xn
E [dn (π
n (Un) ,Xn)]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
π :U→X
E [d (π (Ui) ,Xi)] (32)
= E [d (π (Ui) ,Xi)] ,∀ i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, (33)
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where (32) follows from Lemma 3.3.
While we have (31), (33) and the Markov chain, W ↔ Un ↔ Yn ↔ Wˆ , we now continue with the
following chain of inequalities
nR = H (W ) (34)
= I
(
Wˆ ;W
)
+H
(
W |Wˆ
)
,
≤ I (Un;Yn) +
(
1 + nRP (n)e
)
(35)
= H (Yn)−
n∑
i=1
H (Yi|Ui) +
(
1 + nRP (n)e
)
(36)
=
(
1 + nRP (n)e
)
+
n∑
i=1
(H(Yi)−H(Yi|Ui)) (37)
=
(
1 + nRP (n)e
)
+
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Yi) (38)
≤
(
1 + nRP (n)e
)
+
n∑
i=1
C(I)[ min
π :U→X
E(de(π(Ui),Xi))] (39)
≤
(
1 + nRP (n)e
)
+
n∑
i=1
C(I)(α) (40)
=
(
1 + nRP (n)e
)
+ nC(I)(α), (41)
where (34) follows since W is uniformly distributed over W ,
(35) follows using Fano’s inequality (the second term) and the data processing inequality (the first term)
by recalling that W ↔ Un ↔ Yn ↔ Wˆ forms a Markov chain in the specified order,
(36) follows using (31),
(37) follows since p (yn) =
∏n
i=1
∑
xi
p(yi|xi)p(xi) =
∏n
i=1 p (yi), the communication channel is
memoryless and p (xn) =
∏n
i=1 p(xi), which implies that H (Y
n) =
∑n
i=1H(Yi),
(38) follows using the definition of mutual information,
(39) follows from the definition of information secure MACC capacity,
(40) follows from (33) and C(I) (α) is a nonincreasing function of α,
Using (41) and noting that λ(n) → 0 implies P
(n)
e → 0, we have
R ≤
1
n
+RP (n)e + C
(I) (α)
≤ ǫ+ C(I) (α) , (42)
for any ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n, where (42) follows since P
(n)
e → 0 and 1/n ≤ ǫ for sufficiently
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large n. Therefore (42) implies R < C(I) (α), which concludes the proof.
IV. BINARY ALPHABET CASE WITH ERROR PROBABILITY BASED SECURITY CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we consider a special case of interest where the codewords of the encoder are drawn
from a binary alphabet, i.e., X = Y = U = {0, 1}, the communication channel is a binary symmetric
channel with crossover probability p1 and the perturbation distribution is binary symmetric distribution
with parameter p2. We introduce a closed form expression of the information secure MACC capacity,
i.e.,
C(I) (α) = max
p(u,x)∈Pα
I (U ;Y ) , (43)
for this binary alphabet case. For this special case of interest, we assume that the distortion function is
a Hamming distortion
d(x, xˆ) =
{
0 if x = xˆ
1 if x 6= xˆ
}
which is a well-known distortion measure extensively used in the literature [19]. Note that since the Ham-
ming distortion satisfies E
[
d
((
Xˆ
)
,X
)]
= Pr
(
Xˆ 6= X
)
, then the security constraint E
[
d
((
Xˆ
)
,X
)]
≥
α becomes Pr
(
Xˆ 6= X
)
. Hence the the definition of Pα becomes
Pα
△
=
{
p (u, x)
∣∣∣ min
π :U→X
Pr (π (U) 6= X) ≥ α
}
. (44)
Furthermore, given (U,X) ∼ p (u, x), the estimator XˆMAP
△
= argmax
x
p (x|u) = argmax
x
p (u|x) p (x)
minimizes Pr
(
Xˆ (U) 6= X
)
in (44) and known as the MAP estimator. Then the security constraint
p(u, x) ∈ Pα in (43) becomes
Pr
(
XˆMAP 6= X
)
≥ α. (45)
Note that in order to make the problem valid and meaningful, we necessarily need to have min{p2, 1−
p2} ≥ α, otherwise one of the trivial estimators Xˆ = U and Xˆ = U ⊕ 1 violates the security constraint.
For notational clarity, let us denote
p (u = 0, x = 0) = γ0, p (u = 0, x = 1) = γ1,
p (u = 1, x = 0) = β0, p (u = 1, x = 1) = β1,
where γ0 + γ1 + β0 + β1 = 1. Then clearly, if U = 0, then
XˆMAP =
{
1 if γ0 < γ1
0 if γ0 > γ1
}
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and if U = 1, then
XˆMAP =
{
1 if β0 < β1
0 if β0 > β1
}
.
Hence we have
Pr
(
XˆMAP 6= X
)
= Pr
(
XˆMAP 6= X,U = 0
)
+ Pr
(
XˆMAP 6= X,U = 1
)
= min{γ0, γ1}+min{β0, β1}. (46)
Combining (46) and the security constraint (45), information secure MACC capacity in (43) becomes
C(I) (α) = max
min{γ0,γ1}+min{β0,β1}≥α
I (U ;Y ) . (47)
We continue with a lemma which is given and proved in [18], which states that
I(U ;Y ) = H(X ⊕ Z1 ⊕ Z2)−H(p1 + p2 − 2p1p2), (48)
where Z1 and Z2 are two binary random variables with Pr (Z1 = 1) = p1, Pr (Z1 = 0) = 1 − p1 and
Pr (Z2 = 1) = p2, Pr (Z2 = 0) = 1 − p2 and H (p) is the binary entropy function (with an abuse
of notation), i.e., H (p)
△
= − p log p − (1− p) log (1− p) for p ∈ [0, 1]. Combining (48) and (47), we
next find a closed form expression of the information secure MACC capacity. Note that the information
secure MACC capacity is the maximum mutual information I(U ;Y ), where the maximization carried
over p(u, x) satisfying min{γ0, γ1} + min{β0, β1} ≥ α. Here, instead of analytically maximizing the
mutual information, we find an upper bound on and prove that the upper bound is achievable. Since the
binary entropy is upper bounded by 1, we have
I(U ;Y ) = H(X ⊕ Z1 ⊕ Z2)−H(p1 + p2 − 2p1p2), (49)
≤ 1−H(p1 + p2 − 2p1p2). (50)
To achieve the equality in (50), we choose X as bernoulli 12 , hence we guarantee X ⊕ Z1 ⊕ Z2 to be
bernoulli 12 , i.e., H(X ⊕Z1 ⊕ Z2) = 1 and achieve the equality. By choosing the joint p.m.f. p(u, x) as
γ0 = β1 =
1− p2
2
γ1 = β0 =
p2
2
, (51)
we obtain
p (x = 0) = p (u = 0, x = 0) + p (u = 1, x = 0) = γ0 + β0 =
1− p2
2
+
p2
2
=
1
2
p (x = 1) = p (u = 0, x = 1) + p (u = 1, x = 1) = γ1 + β1 =
p2
2
+
1− p2
2
=
1
2
. (52)
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Fig. 2: The information secure MACC capacity as a function of security constraint α for the binary alphabet case.
Hence we have X to be bernoulli 12 . Furthermore (51) yields
p (u = 1|x = 0) = p (u = 0|x = 1) = 2β0 = 2γ1 =
2p2
2
= p2
p (u = 0|x = 0) = p (u = 1|x = 1) = 2 ∗ β1 = 2γ0 =
2(1− p2)
2
= 1− p2, (53)
which implies that the perturbation distribution is symmetric with p2. Moreover the security constraint
holds since
Pr
(
Xˆ 6= X
)
= min{γ0, γ1}+min{β0, β1} = min{p2, 1− p2}
and we have min{p2, 1− p2} ≥ α. Combining (52), (53) and min{p2, 1− p2} ≥ α, we conclude that by
choosing p(u, x) as in (51), the information secure MACC capacity in (47) becomes
C(I) (α) = max
min{p2,1−p2}≥α
1−H(p1 + p2 − 2p1p2). (54)
Since H(p1 + p2 − 2p1p2) in (54) is symmetric around 1/2, we can assume that 0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1/2.
Note that the binary entropy function H(p) is monotonically increasing for 0 ≥ p ≤ 1/2 and also
p1 + p2 − 2p1p2 is monotonically increasing for 0 ≥ p2 ≤ 1/2. Therefore the maximum of the function
1−H(p1+ p2− 2p1p2), under the constraint that min{p2, 1− p2} ≥ α, is achieved when p2 = α, hence
(54) becomes
C(I) (α) = 1−H(p1 + α− 2p1α) = 1−H(p1 + α(1 − 2p1)), (55)
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yielding a closed form expression for the information secure MACC capacity.
The information secure MACC capacity as a function of the security constraint α for various values of
p1 is shown in Fig. 2. In consistent with the practical setup, we observe a trade-off between the security
and the performance of the communication setup. To maximize the security, or α in our case, one needs to
choose α = 12 . Then the information secure MACC capacity becomes C
(I)
(
1
2
)
= 1−H(p1+1/2−p1) =
0. On the other hand, to maximize the capacity of the system, regardless of the channel, we have to choose
α = 0, i.e., “zero security”.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the content identification problem: (1) where a rights-holder company desires
to keep track of illegal uses of its commercial content, (2) by utilizing resources of a security company,
(3) while securing the privacy of its content, from an information theoretic perspective. The content
identification is modelled as a communication problem using a asymmetric codebooks, where the com-
mercial content of the rights-holder company corresponds to the codebook of an encoder and the hash
values of the content (made available to the security company) corresponds the codebook of a decoder.
The privacy issue in the content identification is modelled by adding certain security constraints to this
communication setup to prevent estimation of the encoder codewords given the decoder codewords. By
this modeling, the proposed problem of reliable communication with asymmetric codebooks with security
constraints provided the fundamental limits of the content identification problem. Under this framework,
we introduced an information capacity and proved that this capacity is equal to the operation capacity of
the system under i.i.d. encoder codewords, yielding the fundamental limits for content identification. As
a well known and widely studied framework, we evaluated the capacity for a binary symmetric channel
and provided closed form expressions.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1
We begin with the proof of the first property that if α is such that Pα is the empty set, then C (α) = 0,
by way of contradiction. Assume that there exists an α0 such that the set Pα0 is empty, while C (α0) > 0.
Hence there exists a rate R > 0 such that (R,α0) pair is achievable. Then, by using the definition of
achievability, we have a sequence of
(
2nR, n
)
MACC (W, fn, hn, gn) such that
lim
n→∞
min
πn :Un→XN
E [d (πn (Un) ,Xn)] ≥ α0. (I-1)
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By using the Lemma 3.3, (I-1) yields
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
π :U→X
E [d (π (Ui) ,Xi)] ≥ α0. (I-2)
Since the codewords of the encoder and the decoder are realizations of an i.i.d. process, then (I-2) becomes
min
π :U→X
E [d (π (U) ,X)] ≥ α0,
which means that Pα0 is not empty by definition of the set Pα, which concludes the proof of the first
property that if α is such that Pα is the empty set, then C (α) = 0.
To prove that the nonempty set Pα is compact, we use Heine-Borel theorem [21] which states that
any subset S of Rn is compact if and only if it is bounded and closed. Since Pα is the set of joint
distributions of the realizations of X and U , then its elements obey the rules of probability, hence the
set is bounded by [0, 1]|X×X| for the discrete finite case. To prove that Pα is closed, we prove that for
every convergent sequence pk ∈ Pα, the limit lies in Pα [21].
Hence, assume that there exists a convergent sequence pk → p in Pα. By using the definition of limit,
∀ǫ > 0 there exists an N such that ∀n ≥ N we have |pn − p| < ǫ. Note that pk(u, x) is in Pα if and
only if
lim
n→∞
min
πn :Un→XN
Epk [d (π
n (Un) ,Xn)] ≥ α. (I-3)
Furthermore, for a given n-fold codebook estimator function πn, we have
Ep [dn (π
n (Un) ,Xn)] =
∑
u
n∈Un
∑
x
n∈Xn
p (un,xn) dn (π
n (un) ,xn)
>
∑
u
n∈Un
∑
x
n∈Xn
(pk (u
n,xn)− ǫ)dn (π
n (un) ,xn)
=
∑
u
n∈Un
∑
x
n∈Xn
(pk (u
n,xn) dn (π
n (un) ,xn)
−
∑
u
n∈Un
∑
x
n∈Xn
ǫdn (π
n (un) ,xn)
>
∑
u
n∈Un
∑
x
n∈Xn
(pk (u
n,xn) dn (π
n (un) ,xn)−
∑
u
n∈Un
∑
x
n∈Xn
Dǫ (I-4)
= Epk [dn (π
n (Un) ,Xn)]− ǫ0, (I-5)
for all ǫ0 > 0, where (I-4) follows since the distortion function is bounded by D. We now define
πnpk = arg min
πn :Un→XN
Epk [dn (π
n (Un) ,Xn)] , (I-6)
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which is well defined since there are finitely many codebook estimator functions. Then, we have
min
πn :Un→XN
Ep [dn (π
n (Un) ,Xn)] = Ep
[
dn
(
πnp (U
n) ,Xn
)]
> Epk
[
dn
(
πnp (U
n) ,Xn
)]
− ǫ (I-7)
> Epk
[
dn
(
πnpk (U
n) ,Xn
)]
− ǫ (I-8)
= min
πn :Un→XN
Epk [dn (π
n (Un) ,Xn)]− ǫ, (I-9)
for all ǫ > 0, where (I-7) follows from (I-5) and (I-8) follows from the definition (I-6). Note that (I-9)
holds for any n > N , yielding
lim
n→∞
min
πn :Un→XN
Ep [d (π
n (Un) ,Xn)] ≥ lim
n→∞
min
πn :Un→XN
Epk [d (π
n (Un) ,Xn)]
≥ α, (I-10)
where (I-10) follows from (I-3). Hence, we proved that the limit lies in Pα, i.e., p ∈ Pα, and the set Pα
is closed. Then, the proof follows from the Heine-Borel Theorem [21].
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